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Comments
AN UPDATE OF THE LAW GOVERNING
PREPAYMENT CLAUSES
This Comment examines the validity of the prepayment clause
in light of the Wellenkamp v. Bank of America decision. The au-
thor reviews the common judicial development of the prepayment
and due-on-sale provisions. The Comment highlights the incon-
sistencies in the law governing the two loan terms and concludes
by suggesting the need for uniformity.
"Creditors have better memories than debtors; they are a superstitious
sect, great observers of set days and time."--Benjamin Franklin
The economic ills which have troubled this country in recent
years are likely to continue in the 1980's. Double-digit inflation,
skyrocketing prices and wages, dollar devaluation, long term unfa-
vorable balances of trade, periodic unemployment, and the large
budget deficits of the federal government characterize the uncer-
tain economy.1 The increased use of credit by all segments of our
society typifies the inflationary trend.2 The real estate industry is
particularly sensitive to fluctuations in the credit indices.3 When
a buyer of real property is able to assume an existing loan with an
interest rate lower than the current prime rate, transferability is
facilitated. The lender, however, is precluded from obtaining the
greater profits which refinancing at higher interest rates would
yield when assumption is permitted.
1. M. GORDON, INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC, BusINEss AND THE ECONOMY
40-74 (33d ed. 1979).
2. B. SPRINKEL, MoNEY AND MARKETS-A MONETARIST VIEw 33-34 (1971).
3. Dasso, Lender Participation Financing: Its Nature and Significance to Ap-
praisers, REAL EST. APPRAISER, Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 13-14.
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Motivated by the desire to maximize profits and limit losses
during periods of unstable interest rates, lenders have attempted
to regulate the assumption of existing loans.4 In order to achieve
this goal, clauses originally designed to protect security interests
have been employed to insure economic advantages during times
of volatile interest rates.5 The lender frequently uses the prepay-
ment and the due-on-sale clauses to enhance profits during times
of erratic interest rates.
In California the trustor of a real estate loan is generally not
permitted to prepay his debt without the consent of the lender.6
Real estate financing agreements often include a prepayment
clause which governs the right of the debtor to repay the loan
before maturity.7 Such clauses typically provide for the assess-
ment of a "penalty," "fee," or "bonus" for early payment.8
An acceleration provision in a trust deed or mortgage gives the
lender the right to demand immediate payment of the outstand-
ing secured debt under certain circumstances. 9 The acceleration
provision usually takes the form of a due-on-sale clause. A sale or
transfer of the security interest will trigger the due-on-sale clause
and the loan becomes immediately due and payable.1O
The due-on-sale provision and the prepayment clause may in-
teract to shift the economic burden of unstable interest rates to
the borrower." In the event of a sale, the due-on-sale provision
permits acceleration of the loan which in turn creates an early
payment. This early payment results in the assessment of a pen-
alty under the prepayment clause. As a consequence of the com-
bined exercise of these clauses, not only is assumption prevented,
but the entire transfer is inhibited. Alienation is restrained.
In 1978, the California Supreme Court ruled, in Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America, that the automatic acceleration of a loan is an
unreasonable restraint on alienation absent some showing of an
4. Almost without exception, the due-on-sale provisions of institutional lend-
ing agreements are specifically designed to prevent assumption in the event of a
transfer. Toone, "Due on Sale" Revisited, 55 SAN DIEGO REALTOR 12 (1980).
5. 1 H. MILLER & M. STAREF, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 3:64
(rev. ed. 1975).
6. R. BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE
§§ 2.46-.47 (1979).
7. Id.
8. See 1 H. MLER & M. STARI, supra note 5, § 3:70; 13 AM. JuR. LEGAL FORMS
2D Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 179 (1971).
9. J. CARTwmcGrr, GLOssARY OF REAL ESTATE LAw 11-12 (1972).
10. Id.
11. Bonano, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in
California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6
U.S.F. L. REV. 267, 271 (1972).
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impairment to the security.12 Prior to Wellenkamp the validity of
the prepayment penalty had been established in decisions that
relied on the rationale employed in upholding the legitimacy of
acceleration clauses.13
It is the purpose of this Comment to analyze the prepayment
clause in light of the Wellenkamp decision. A brief survey of the
doctrine of restraints on alienation and the law governing the pre-
payment and due-on-sale provisions will be presented. Emphasis
will be placed on the current inconsistency in the law governing
these clauses after Wellenkamp. This Comment concludes by
suggesting that the prepayment penalty is an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation and should be conformed to the rationale set
forth in Wellenkamp.
THE PREPAYMENT CLAUSE
The prepayment clause governs the "right" of the borrower to
pay off his loan before maturity. The lender has the right to insist
on receiving payment neither early nor late.14 Except in certain
limited situations, the mortgagor does not possess the prerogative
of prepaying the debt unless the right is expressly granted by
contract. 15 The two most common types of prepayment terms are
the "option" and "non-option" fees. The non-option situation oc-
curs when the loan agreement is silent with respect to prepay-
ment. Under such circumstances, when the borrower desires to
prepay, he must negotiate with the lender regarding the charge
assessed for the privilege of premature remittance.16 On the
other hand, the option type expressly provides for the right to
prepay at a predetermined fee.17
A typical option prepayment clause appears as follows:
Privilege is reserved to make additional payments on the principal of this
indebtedness at any time without penalty, except that as to any such pay-
ments that exceed 20% of the original principal amount of this loan during
any successive 21-month period beginning with the date of this promis-
sory note, the maker agrees to pay, as consideration for acceptance of
such payment, six months advance interest on that part of the aggregate
amount of all prepayments in excess of said 20%.18
12. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
13. IL BERNHARDT, supra note 6, § 2.46.
14. Id.
15. See Snaiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16, 124 P. 433 (1912).
16. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 5, § 3:70.
17. Id.
18. I. BERNHARDT, supra note 6, § 2.47.
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A borrower who is subject to the above clause and who owes
$100,000 at fifteen percent interest could be penalized as much as
$6,000 for prepayment. Unfortunately, when applying for a loan
few borrowers contemplate the effects of a prepayment, even
when the contract contains an option term.1 9 Obviously, in a cli-
mate of economic duress, the prepaying borrower is at the
lender's mercy.2 0
The most common situation giving rise to a prepayment occurs
when property is sold. In the event of a sale, the due-on-sale
clause and prepayment provisions operate to the borrower's detri-
ment. The due-on-sale term forces acceleration of the loan which
precludes assumption by a prospective buyer. The acceleration
generates a prepayment and a penalty is charged under the pre-
payment clause. The ultimate result is a restraint on alienation.
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
The right to freely transfer land is characterized by a long his-
tory of judicial battles.2 1 In the real estate context, the doctrine of
restraints on alienation is aimed at restrictions in conveyancing
instruments which either expressly or impliedly prohibit or pe-
nalize the right to transfer real property. The basis of the doc-
trine lies in the social policy disfavoring restrictions that might
remove property from commerce, concentrate wealth, suppress
creditors, or deter property development.2 2 Restraints may be to-
tal or partial depending on whether a restriction precludes trans-
fer or merely limits the time and manner of conveyance. Such
constraints may be imposed either directly or indirectly,23 de-
pending on whether they prohibit or condition the transfer, or
merely penalize alienation.2 4
California Civil Code section 711 was enacted to prohibit re-
19. See generally 1 H. MILER & M. STARR, supra note 5.
20. The economic duress situation ordinarily involves a lack of free choice and
unequal bargaining positions. Yet, Professor Williston indicates that "ft]he
threatened person need only be compelled to choose between regrettable alterna-
tives." 13 WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS § 1602 (3d ed. 1970).
Certainly the seller of real property, subject to a prepayment clause, is forced to
make the regrettable decision between bearing the expense of a prepayment pen-
alty upon acceleration of the debt and not selling at all. In a New York case, abuse
was evident when a $2,000 penalty was exacted for a prepayment of less than
$15,000. Feldman v. Kings Highway Say. Bank, 278 A.D. 589, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306, afrd
303 N.Y. 675, 102 N.E.2d 835 (1951).
21. Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real
Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV. 747, 757-67 (1973).
22. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TExT ON PROPERTY 1008 (2d ed. 1969).
23. Id.
24. L Snas & A. SMrrH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1112 (2d ed. 1956).
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straints on alienation.2 5 The California Supreme Court, however,
has ruled that section 711 bars only unreasonable restraints on
alienation.26 This prohibition against unreasonable restraints
necessarily involves a balancing test. The interests served by a
restraint must outweigh the social policy disfavoring limitations
on alienation.27
Prepayment and due-on-sale clauses are examples of indirect
restrictions.28 Neither clause is a restraint on alienation per se,
because neither directly prohibits the transfer of property. Never-
theless, when the lender invokes the prepayment and due-on-sale
provisions, alienation is effectively restrained because of the in-
creased cost of a conveyance. 29
Due-On-Sale
Real estate lending agreements commonly contain provisions
that restrain the borrower from transferring the security interest
without the consent of the lender.30 These provisions grant to the
lender the authority or option to accelerate the balance due on
the loan in the event of a conveyance. 31 The "due-on-sale clause"
is the generic name given such provisions.
The chronological development of the validity of the due-on-
sale clause in California parallels the judicial attitude toward con-
sumerism. Prior to 1930 such clauses were almost nonexistent.3 2
The courts that initially upheld the validity of due-on-sale clauses
based their decisions on the rationale of protecting the lender's
security interest.33
The California Supreme Court first considered the validity of an
25. CAi. CIrv. CODE § 711 (West 1954) ("Conditions restraining alienation,
when repugnant to the interest created, are void.").
26. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1964).
27. [The restraint is valid] if the objectives behind the imposition of the
restraint are sufficiently important to outweigh the social evils which flow
from the enforcement of the restraint or if the interference with the power
of alienation is so insignificant that no appreciable harm results from the
enforcement of the restraint.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 410, Comment a (1944).
28. These provisions penalize transfers rather than prohibit them.
29. See Comment, Debtor-Selection Provisions Found in Trust Deeds and the
Extent of Their Enforceability in the Courts, 35 S. CAT- L. REV. 475, 477-80 (1962).
30. 1 H. ILLER & M. STARR, supra note 5, §§ 3:64-:65.
31. Id.
32. See Bonano, supra note 11, at 271.
33. Id.
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acceleration clause in Coast Bank v. Minderhout.34 Writing for
the majority, Justice Traynor recognized that acceleration provi-
sions impose restraints on alienation.35 He concluded, however,
that public policy justifies reasonable restraints on alienation' in
order to protect the security interest of the lender. Justice Tray-
nor analyzed the validity of the clause on its face rather than con-
sidering its impact on transferability.3 6 He employed a theoretical
approach in dealing with the doctrine of restraints on alienation.37
Justice Traynor also failed to make any distinction between the
due-on-sale and due-on-encumbrance provisions. As a result,
subsequent decisions assumed that automatic enforcement of
both provisions was proper.38
Seven years after Minderhout, the court considered the reason-
ableness of a due-on-encumbrance clause in La Sala v. American
Savings and Loan Association39 and distinguished it from due-
on-sale provisions. The restraint in La Sala permitted accelera-
tion of the debt upon encumbrance of the security. When the bor-
rower obtained a second mortgage on his property, the lender
sought to accelerate the debt automatically. The court, noting
that the "reasonable necessity" for enforcement of the due-on-
sale provision does not apply with equal force to restraints
against future encumbrances, 40 indicated that two factors should
be balanced in applying the reasonable necessity standard. The
degree of restraint on alienation must be weighed against the po-
tential impairment of the lender's security.4 1 Therefore, the court
held that the due-on-encumbrance clause could not be exercised
automatically unless the lender could demonstrate that enforce-
ment was reasonably necessary to protect his interest in the se-
curity.
The cases that followed La Sala expanded the rights of the bor-
rower by extending the balancing approach. In Tucker v. Lassen
34. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
35. Id. at 315, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
36. Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due-On-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopt-
ing Standards of Unreasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. RaV. 1109,
1113 (1975).
37. Id. Justice Traynor discussed the restraints on alienation that are permit-
ted in estates less than fee interests but did not consider the economic effects on
modern transfers.
38. The first decision which failed to go beyond the inflexible rule of Minder-
hout was Jones v. Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr.
741 (1967). See also Mountain Brow Lodge, LO.O.F. v. Tuscano, 257 Cal. App. 2d 22,
64 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1967).
39. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
40. Id. at 879-80, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
41. Id. at 877-78, 489 P.2d at 1121, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
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Savings & Loan Association,42 the supreme court held that auto-
matic acceleration of a due-on-sale clause would not be permitted
with respect to installment land sales. The court enlarged the
reasonableness doctrine by balancing the interests of the bor-
rower directly against those of the lender.43 As the quantum of
restraint arising from an acceleration clause increases, the
lender's burden of justifying enforcement also increases. The
court found that the quantum of restraint arising from a due-on-
sale clause is significant and that the risks of waste and default in
an installment land sale are slight.44 Therefore, the minimal im-
pairment of security resulting from an installment land sale
places a significant burden on the lender to show enforcement is
necessary. The court also rejected the lender's use of the acceler-
ation clause as a device to hedge against rising interest rates. 45
Against this background, the California Supreme Court in 1978
made a decisive move to protect the borrower against the unrea-
sonable enforcement of acceleration provisions. In the landmark
case of Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, the court held that auto-
matic exercise of a due-on-sale clause would not be permitted ab-
sent a showing of impairment to the lender's security interest.46
This rule was held to apply even in the situation where there is
an outright sale of the security interest.
In order to reach their conclusion, the court applied the balanc-
ing principles established in La Sala and Tucker.47 Justice Man-
ual found that a transaction may be "inhibited entirely" if the
lender refuses to permit the buyer to assume an existing loan.46
Moreover, the alternative of allowing assumption at an increased
interest rate would still have an "inhibitory effect."49 Thus, the
seller would be forced to either reduce the purchase price and ab-
sorb the loss, or not sell at all. Justice Manual concluded that, in
either event, the restraint on alienation is apparent. 50
The court rejected the argument that the risks of waste and de-
fault in an outright sale are enhanced when the borrow/seller no
42. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
43. Id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 640, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
46. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 949, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
48. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
49. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
50. Id.
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-longer retains an interest in the transferred security.5 ' Assump-
tion does not invariably increase the lender's risks.52 When the
buyer makes a down payment equal to the seller's equity interest,
an incentive exists not to commit waste. In any case, the lender is
not justified in automatically assuming that the buyer presents a
greater risk than the seller.53
The court also rejected the argument that automatic enforce-
ment of the due-on-sale provision is necessary in order to main-
tain a loan portfolio which reflects current interest rates.54 The
court approached this argument by examining the relative eco-
nomic burdens of the lender and borrower. Justice Manual indi-
cated that the hardships of an inflationary economy are inherent
risks which the lender must bear. The lender is typically more so-
phisticated than the borrower and better equipped to project
changes in economic conditions.55 The due-on-sale provision's
purpose of protecting the lender's security interest is inconsistent
with the bank's economic justifications.56 Therefore, "it would be
unjust to place the burden of the lender's mistaken economic pro-
jections on property owners exercising their right to freely alien-
ate their property."5 7 The court did not, however, consider the
validity of the prepayment clause nor its consequent economic
burdens.
Prepayment Clauses
Early attacks on prepayment charges were manifested in a vari-
ety of claims. Borrowers asserted that the fees were excessive
and usurious. 58 However, although California has long recognized
the unenforceability of excessive penalty provisions,59 the courts
have uniformly rejected the usury argument on the rationale that
the prepayment fee is not an actual charge for the use of the
money.60 Instead, the courts have interpreted the fee as an op-
tional expense incurred by the borrower for discontinuing the use
of the money.61
51. Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
52. Id.




57. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
58. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 5, § 3:71.
59. Lazzareschi v. San Francisco Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 417 (1971); Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1969).
60. Lazzareschi v. San Francisco Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 308, 99
Cal. Rptr. 417,420 (1971).
61. Id.
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Borrowers have also asserted that the prepayment charge is an
unlawful attempt to acquire liquidated damages. Accordingly,
such borrowers claimed that the usual prepayment situation
should be governed by liquidated-damages statutes. 62 Such stat-
utes permit the lender to predetermine the amount of damages
only when it would be extremely difficult to assess actual dam-
ages. Since the lender can accurately fix damages at the time of
prepayment, assessment of a predetermined or fixed rate prepay-
ment charge would be an invalid penalty.63 The courts have held,
however, that prepayment penalties are not liquidated damages
since most prepayments are voluntary.64
-The most common attack on prepayment charges has been that
they are unreasonable restraints on alienation. In Hellbaum v.
Lytton Savings & Loan Association of Northern California, the
California District Court of Appeal considered the validity of a
prepayment clause which was coupled with an acceleration provi-
sion.65 Relying on the decision in Minderhout, the court began by
examining the law governing due-on-sale provisions and sug-
gested that the "justifiable interest" which permits automatic ex-
ercise of the acceleration clause also permits prepayment
penalties.66 The court apparently accepted the argument, that ad-
ministrative costs and the threat of idle money are justifiable in-
terests which support the assessment of a prepayment penalty.
Prepayment penalties, therefore, even when coupled with the ex-
ercise of an acceleration clause, do not constitute unreasonable
restraints on alienation.67 The decision, however, did not clarify
whether the exercise of the prepayment clause standing alone
would be an unreasonable restraint. No clear distinction was
made between the justifiable interests that support the exercise
of prepayment clauses and those that support the exercise of ac-
celeration clauses.
The prepayment charge that results from acceleration of the
loan may be said to be a consequence of the borrower's actions.
62. Meyers v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 38 CaL App. 3d 544, 113 Cal. Rptr. 358
(1974).
63. Mink, Prepayment Penalties in California, 4 J. BEVERLY HILs BA. 26
(1970).
64. See generally Comment, Secured Real Estate Loan Prepayment and the
Prepayment Penalty, 51 CAL. L. REv. 923 (1963).
65. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 CaL Rptr. 9 (1969).
66. Id. at 459, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
67. Id.
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The borrower is the one who initiates a transfer of the security.
However, penalties for involuntary prepayments which are
neither the fault of the lender nor the borrower present a differ-
ent problem.
Although it would appear inequitable to penalize a borrower for
an involuntary sale, such was the case in Lazzareschi Investment
Co. v. San Francisco Federal Savings & Loan Association.68 An
involuntary prepayment resulted when the court ordered that the
property securing a debt be sold in a divorce action. The existing
loan contained a prepayment clause which expressly provided for
the assessment of a penalty regardless of whether the prepay-
ment was voluntary or involuntary. The court held that the
lender could exact the prepayment charge and that such a re-
quirement was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation.69
Under such reasoning, it would appear appropriate for a lender to
accelerate a loan and then assess a penalty for the resulting early
payment.
The Hellbaum case, which established the validity of prepay-
ment clauses, was derived from the rationale in Minderhout re-
garding due-on-sale provisions. The court in Minderhout
specifically noted that the two clauses bear "the same relation" to
the doctrine of restraints on alienation.7 0 This line of cases needs
to be reassessed in light of the recent Wellenkamp decision. Al-
though Wellenkamp did not expressly refer to the validity of pre-
payment penalties, the decision does represent the most recent
ruling of the California Supreme Court on the validity of accelera-
tion provisions as restraints on alienation. Therefore, the contin-
ued cogency of the prepayment clause is questionable.
THE VALIDITY OF THE PREPAYMENT PENALTY AFTER WELLENKAMP
The restraining effect of prepayment penalties must be recon-
sidered in light of the Wellenkamp decision. California Civil Code
section 711 precludes unreasonable restraints on alienation. The
Wellenkamp case holds that automatic exercise of the due-on-
sale clause is an unreasonable restraint on alienation absent
some showing of impairment to the lender's security.7 1 There is
no doubt that a prepayment penalty can be unreasonable. When
a prepayment charge is levied on a percentage basis without re-
gard to the lender's actual costs or impairment to security, the fee
68. 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971).
69. Id. at 311, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
70. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1964).
71. See text accompanying notes 46-57 supra.
1056
[voL 17: 1047, 1980] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
becomes a penalty. This method of exacting the prepayment fine
is clearly an unreasonable restraint on alienation. There is no
justification in law or public policy for the imposition of a penalty-
type restraint upon alienation of the security.7 2 Nevertheless, this
is exactly the result of a prepayment penalty incident to the exer-
cise of the due-on-sale clause according to the rule announced in
Hellbaum. Although the lender has an interest in guarding
against transfers of its security interest to insolvent persons,
there is no "justifiable interest" in penalizing the parties to a con-
veyance when a transfer is made to a qualified purchaser.
The court in Wellenkamp rejected the argument that transfers
invariably enhance the risks of default and waste and that auto-
matic acceleration is necessary in order to maintain a current
loan portfolio.73 The decision focused primarily on the lender's
right in protecting his security interest. Therefore, a lender's
right to exercise a prepayment clause should also be based on
justifiable interests which outweigh any restraints on alienation.
The interests mentioned in the Hellbaum case were the admin-
istrative expenses incurred by the lender in the event of a prepay-
ment and the lender's desire to avoid idle money. The
administrative expenses incident to an early payment are not suf-
ficient to warrant the automatic exercise of a prepayment clause
that exacts a percentage-type penalty. Certainly the lender is ca-
pable of appraising reconveyance costs accurately. Further, the
lender is undoubtedly better equipped to forecast economic con-
ditions than the typical borrower. The assessment of a fee to
cover administrative expenses is not unreasonable per se. Yet,
the lender should not be permitted to predetermine prepayment
charges on a percentage basis without regard to actual costs.
Likewise, the lender should not be allowed to negotiate a prepay-
ment charge in the "non-option" situation in an atmosphere of ec-
onomic duress.
The lender's interest in avoiding idle money is also a justifica-
tion without merit. When interest rates are rising the lender ben-
efits by prepayments. More funds are available to lend out at
higher rates. When interest rates decrease the flow of money is
greater. Lower rates typically stimulate more lending, which
thereby permits the lender to recirculate more money-usually at
1057
72. Bonano, supra note 11, at 283.
73. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
a faster turnover. In any case, regardless of the economic condi-
tions, the lender can immediately place funds into government
bonds in order to avoid idle money. The logical application of the
rationale employed in Wellenkamp indicates that the prepayment
clause should not be used as a weapon for the purpose of generat-
ing profits or in maintaining a loan portfolio that reflects current
interest rates.
Finally, the need to conform the law governing prepayment
clauses to that of acceleration provisions is of particular impor-
tance when the possibility of abuse is considered. Lenders will
undoubtedly try to escape the requirements of Wellenkamp. This
may be possible because of the inconsistency in the law gov-
erning prepayment and due-on-sale provisions. Since the
Hellbaum court referred to the prepayment penalty as an "as-
sumption fee," this terminology could be employed by the lender
to evade the mandate of Wellenkamp. Rather than accelerate the
debt upon a sale, the lender could simply impose an assumption
fee on the assuming borrower. In effect, the lender complies with
Wellenkamp by not accelerating the loan while assessing an as-
sumption penalty. Such casuistry shifts the burden of higher in-
terest rates to the borrower and permits the lender to
approximate a current loan portfolio.
CONCLUSION
The inflationary turmoil and unstable economy of recent years
has dramatically increased the use of credit. The increased use of
credit has focused judicial attention on clauses in lending agree-
ments that unreasonably restrain alienation. The due-on-sale
clause is a prime example. The Wellenkamp decision represents
the culmination of this concern. In Wellenkamp, the California
Supreme Court decisively shifted the burden of fluctuating inter-
est rates to the lender. The implications of Wellenkamp are broad
and far-reaching. Application of the consumer-oriented attitude
manifested in Wellenkamp will have a significant effect on other
clauses in lending agreements.
The prepayment penalty represents a clause particularly sus-
ceptible to the reasoning established in Wellenkamp. A re-exami-
nation of the validity of the prepayment clause is necessitated.
The case law defining when the prepayment clause may be exer-
cised is antiquated. Decisions that supported the use of prepay-
ment penalties were based on the rationale of acceleration cases
that were rejected by Wellenkamp.
Therefore, since the courts have always disfavored unreasona-
ble restraints on alienation, the law governing prepayment penal-
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ties should be updated. The analysis and cases presented in this
Comment demonstrate that the automatic exercise of the prepay-
ment clause effectively restrains free alienation. Should the valid-
ity of the prepayment clause come before the California Supreme
Court, the court should conform the law of prepayment clauses to
the Wellenkamp rationale. Reasonable assessment of a prepay-
ment charge entails an accurate evaluation of the lender's costs.
It does not involve a predetermined amount, a percentage-based
penalty, or automatic enforcement.
MICHAEL GRANT
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